1.0 Background:
1.1 During the autumn of 2002 Lord (David) Alton (DA) met with a North Korean Christian who visited the House of Lords. The refugee was in London as a guest of Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW) and recounted how his wife and child had died during the famine in the DPRK. He had fled across the border with his remaining child, who had tragically died as they journeyed to a third country. He graphically described the fate of those refugees who were forcibly repatriated by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the DPRK. Cruel punishments were reserved for those with a political or religious belief at variance with the ideology of the DPRK's rulers.
1.2
DA promised that he would seek to raise the DPRK's record on human rights in the
British Parliament and tabled a motion for debate. Some of the material was subsequently used in The Suffering
Church series recorded for the American Catholic TV network, EWTN, and which
included a programme on the DPRK.
1.3
Subsequently DA received reports, via Wilfred Wong of the British Jubilee
Campaign, and Jubilee America, about cases they were tracking. During his
January 2003 visit to Laos, Vietnam and the Burma border with Ann Buwalda of
Jubilee America and Congressman Joseph Pitts (Rep. Pennsylvania) the possibility
of taking further action on North Korea was frequently discussed. Back in the UK
DA spoke with Baroness (Caroline) Cox (CC) - who had been actively pursuing the
North Korean question in Geneva - and time was finally secured for DA’s debate
in the House of Lords (the only one to have taken place in either House). Both
Jubilee Campaign and CSW provided copious briefing material on human rights
violations to Members of the House.
1.4 When the debate occurred in March 2003 (see Appendix A, Hansard, for the written record) it was over-shadowed by the DPRK's decision to recommence its nuclear weapons programme and to refuse access to its facilities by inspectors. In one respect this was providential because it ensured the presence of some senior political figures for the debate. This consisted of a series of speeches that mixed the security and human rights questions.
1.5 James Mawdsley (JM) and a
representative of CSW had discussed the possibility of a parliamentary
delegation visiting the DPRK and when JM put this proposal to DA he expressed
enthusiasm (and suggested that we might invite a Congressman or Senator to join
us). JM subsequently approached the recently opened DPRK Embassy on behalf of DA
and CC. The embassy's political
officer, Mr.Ha Sin Guk, came to see the prospective delegation at Westminster.
He undertook to put our request to Pyongyang. Within 48 hours he told us that
such a visit would be welcomed. The DPRK said that they would wish the group to
be entirely British rather than British-American, whilst not ruling out such a
possibility for the future.
1.6
Our request was timely as the UK had been the first country to avail itself of
the EU decision to lift restrictions on diplomatic relations and to open an
embassy in Pyongyang.
1.7
We emphasized that among the issues we would wish to discuss in the DPRK would
be human rights and that we would want to visit churches. The Foreign Office
were closely informed of these discussions and offered no objection to such an
initiative.
1.8
Following a further meeting at the House of Lords DA, CC and JM visited the DPRK
Embassy on 9th Sep, their National Day. Among the others present was Mr. Jon
Benjamin, Head of the Human Rights Policy Department and Mr. Christopher W.
Osborne, Deputy Head of Protocol Division and Assistant Marshal of the
Diplomatic Corps, at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
1.9
The delegation arrived in the DPRK on September 13th 2003 for a
six-day visit. It was the first
delegation from the House of Lords to ever visit the DPRK, and the first UK
parliamentary visit in more than a decade. It is difficult to adequately
emphasize the importance the North Koreans placed on having a deputy Speaker of
the House of the Lords with us. This opened up the opportunity to meet senior
members of their Assembly and Government.
1.10
Before departing the delegation carefully discussed our objectives and depending
on how the visit progressed (and whether it was or was not used for propaganda
purposes) we would determine our response. Although our primary reason for
travelling to the DPRK was not to engage in the issues surrounding the nuclear
standoff it inevitably dominated the talks with our hosts.
1.11 We were struck by the parallels with the latter days of the Cold War. Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. and Britain used Cruise Missiles and military power to creatively force hardheaded negotiations with the Soviet Union (USSR). At the time, Margaret Thatcher famously said of Mikhail Gorbachev, a former head of the KGB, this is "a man with whom we can do business." Ronald Reagan correctly countered the threat of force with force while simultaneously encouraging glasnost, perestroika, the Helsinki Process and constructive engagement.
1.12
Although there are parallels to be drawn there are also some important
differences. The regime in Pyongyang presides over a small country with a siege
mentality (more like Albania than the USSR). Systematic isolation has made it
fearful and defensive. China's subtle support for the US (in the recent
six-nations talks held to resolve the nuclear stand-off) has left it feeling
even more cornered.
1.13
The prevailing ideology is premised on the personality cult of worship of their
dead leader (Kim Il Sung) and the dynastic succession of his son, Kim Jong Il,
mixed with Marxist-Leninism, neo-Confucianism, Communism, and Patriotism. There
is a strong component anti-Americanism and the legacy of suffering inflicted
during the Japanese occupation.
1.14
As we left the DPRK, Patriot Missiles were being deployed along the border with
South Korea by the US. Tensions
continue to be high at the time of writing.
1.15
Not to have engaged in this momentous question, and its resolution, would have
undermined the seriousness and credibility of our delegation. If we had appeared
narrow or myopic in our concerns it would have also undermined our long-term
hopes for fundamental change on religious liberties and human rights concerns.
1.16 It was our unanimous view that out of this serious crisis can come the possibility for further and deeper engagement on the whole raft of human rights, religious liberties, economic and humanitarian issues.