These
fall into three categories: Security; Political; and Economic.
3.1. Security
·
It
is not unimaginable that the DPRK may feel trapped by the failure to resolve the
nuclear confrontation and so test a nuclear weapon. This would trigger
disastrous consequences, even the possibility of a nuclear strike by the US and
its allies. We recommend that the two conditions for denuclearisation, i.e. a
commitment to no first strike by either side and a pledge of peaceful
co-existence should be offered by the US to the DPRK. This does not require
bilateral talks. It would soon become evident whether the DPRK’s promised
response of denuclearisation is a mirage but nothing would have been lost by
such a move.
·
We
believe a peaceful outcome is indeed possible; that the DPRK is exhausted and
weakened and does not seem to pose any real military threat (and is an unwelcome
distraction at a time of confrontation with radical Islamic terrorist
organizations).
·
The
DPRK seems genuinely afraid that they will be attacked and needs to be offered
some “face saving” formula to permit a lowering of the temperature.
·
Private
informal “backstairs” talks between the US and the DPRK should continue and
be encouraged but not replace the multilateral talks. The outcome of those talks
might usefully be guaranteed by the EU or UN.
·
Until
last October the US were able to enter the DPRK to search for bodies of
servicemen missing in action. We would like to see such arrangements recommenced
and informal reciprocal meetings of army officers from both sides.
·
The
DPRK said that they were purposefully misquoted by Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly in October 2002 in saying that they had a nuclear device. They claim
they actually said they had “a more powerful weapon than a nuclear bomb,
namely single hearted unity of the nation.” Their hint is that they do not
actually have such weapons but the evidence is mixed and we believe that as a
condition of “peaceful co-existence" it would be imperative for the
resumption of International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.
3.2.
Political
·
We
recommend the encouragement of Helsinki-style initiatives of mutual engagement
between the DPRK and the West/South Korea.
·
There
is nothing to fear from a step-by-step approach towards two systems in one
country and we should offer models and evidence (e.g. Hong Kong/China and models
for Joint Assemblies such as the Council of Europe).
·
The
German experience of re-unification should inspire confidence in such a process
taking place in Korea.
·
There
should be an end to isolationism and a normalization of diplomatic relations. In
the worst days of the Soviet Union there was always a US Embassy in Moscow. The
US experience in China and Vietnam in using trade as a stimulus for reform would
also be pertinent.
·
The
US and UK should encourage more parliamentarians and Members of Congress to
travel to the DPRK and to engage them in dialogue.
·
President
Clinton predicted the implosion of the DPRK. This was a miscalculation but a
policy of asphyxiation could also be a dangerous miscalculation.
·
The
DPRK needs to understand that pluralism, the creation of genuine opposition
parties, free speech, open dialogue on human rights, religious and political
liberties, will all have to be addressed before South Korea allows a permanent
deepening of relationships
·
We
recommend that pressure continue to be asserted in requesting the admission of
an independent assessment team to visit the prisons. Such a team might include
doctors, lawyers and engineers and might seek EU resources to allow for the
rebuilding of the prisons.
·
China’s
role in repatriating a significant number of DPRK refugees should be challenged
by the international community. As most leave for economic reasons, aid
programmes need to be re-established in the northern areas most affected by
hunger. When leaving for reasons of persecution an orderly passage to South
Korea should be guaranteed by the international community.
3.3 Economic
·
The
economic fortunes of the DPRK are dependent on progress being made on security
and political concerns.
·
Projects
such as the railway linking the north and south should be expedited and
passenger transportation (as well as cargo) be encouraged.
·
Investors
and NGOs are wary of an uncertain future: many more would come if the key
questions were resolved.
·
Internet
and mobile phone networks should be opened up.
·
The
British Council should open and office in Pyongyang; meet the huge demand for
English as a Foreign Language; and provide the university with more English
publications.
·
Requested
exchanges of students, especially students in business studies, should be
expedited.
·
We
share the DPRK view that emergency aid should be complemented by development
aid. We recommend that a priority should be small micro projects (such as the
water irrigation and purification project established by the Irish aid agency,
Concern, at Anju, that we mention at Page 4 of our report).